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Abstract—The ideals of the eighteenth century’s Age of En-
lightenment are the foundation of modern democracies. The
era was characterized by thinkers who promoted progressive
social reforms that opposed the long-established aristocracies and
monarchies of the time. Prominent examples of such reforms
include the establishment of inalienable human rights, self-
governing republics, and market capitalism. Twenty-first cen-
tury democratic nations can benefit from revisiting the systems
developed during the Enlightenment and reframing them within
the techno-social context of the Information Age. This article
explores the application of social algorithms that make use
of Thomas Paine’s (English: 1737–1809) representatives, Adam
Smith’s (Scottish: 1723–1790) self-interested actors, and Marquis
de Condorcet’s (French: 1743–1794) optimal decision making
groups. It is posited that technology-enabled social algorithms can
better realize the ideals articulated during the Enlightenment.
Index Terms—collective decision making, computational gover-
nance, e-participation, e-democracy, computational social choice
theory.
I. INTRODUCTION
Eighteenth century Europe is referred to as The Age of
Enlightenment, a period when prominent thinkers began to
question traditional forms of authority and power and the
moral standards that supported these forms. One of the most
significant and enduring contributions of the time was the
notion that a government’s existence should be predicated on
protecting and supporting the natural, immutable rights of its
citizens. Among these rights are the right to self-governance,
autonomy of thought, and equality. The inherent virtue of
these ideas forced many European nations to relinquish time-
honored aristocratic and monarchic systems. Moreover, it
was the philosophy of the Enlightenment that inspired the
formalization of a governing structure that would define a new
nation: the United States of America.
Natural rights exposed during the Enlightenment are im-
mutable. That is, they are rights not granted by the govern-
ment, but instead are rights inherent to man. However, the
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systems that maintain and support these rights merit no such
permanence. While modern democratic governments strive to
achieve the ideals of the Enlightenment, it is put forth that
governments can better serve them by making greater use of
the technological advances of the present day Information Age.
The technological infrastructure that now supports modern
nations removes the physical restrictions that dictated many
of the design choices of these early government architects. As
such, many of today’s government structures are remnants of
the technological constraints of the eighteenth century. Modern
nations have an obligation to improve their systems so as to
better ensure the fulfillment of the rights of man. Inscribed at
the Jefferson Memorial is this statement by Thomas Jefferson
(American: 1743–1826), another thinker of the Enlightenment:
“[...] institutions must go hand in hand with the progress
of the human mind. As that becomes more developed, more
enlightened [...] institutions must advance also to keep pace
with the times.” To move in this direction, the principle of
citizen representation as articulated by Thomas Paine (En-
glish: 1737–1809) and the principle of competitive actors for
the common good as articulated by Adam Smith (Scottish:
1723–1790) are considered from a techno-social, collective
decision making systems perspective. Moreover, the rationale
for these principles can be understood within the mathematical
formulations of Marquis de Condorcet’s (French: 1743–1794)
requirements for optimal decision making.
II. THE CONDORCET JURY THEOREM: ENSURING
OPTIMAL DECISION MAKING
Marquis de Condorcet (portrayed in Figure 1) ardently
supported equal rights and free and universal public education.
These ideals were driven as much by his ethics as they were
by his mathematical investigations into the requirements for
optimal decision making. One of his most famous results is
the Condorcet statement and its associated theorem. In his
1785 Essai sur l’Application de l’Analyse aux Probabilite´s des
Decisions prises a` la Pluralite´ des Voix (english translation:
Essay on the Application of Analysis to the Probability of
Majority Decisions), Condorcet states that when a group of
“enlightened” decision makers chooses between two options
under a majority rule, then as the size of the decision making
population tends toward infinity, it becomes a certainty that
the best choice is rendered [1]. The first statistical proof
of this statement is the Condorcet jury theorem. The model
is expressed as follows. Imagine there exists n independent
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2Fig. 1. A portrait of Marquis de Condorcet. This is a public domain
photograph courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.
decision makers and each decision maker has a probability
p ∈ [0, 1] of choosing the best of two options in a decision.
If p > 0.5, meaning that each individual decision maker is
enlightened, and as n→∞, the probability of a majority vote
outcome rendering the best decision approaches certainty at
1.0. This is known as the “light side” of the Condorcet jury
theorem. The “dark side” of the theorem states that if p < 0.5
and as n → ∞, the probability of a majority vote outcome
rendering the best decision approaches 0.0. Figure 2 plots the
relationship between p and n, where the gray scale values
denote a range from 100% probability of the group rendering
the best decision (white) to a 0% probability (black).
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Fig. 2. The relationship between p ∈ [0, 1] and n ∈ (1, 2, . . . , 100)
according to the Condorcet jury theorem model. Darker values represent a
lower probability of a majority vote rendering the best decision and the lighter
values represent a higher probability of a majority vote rendering the best
decision.
The Condorcet jury theorem is one of the original formal
justifications for the application of democratic principles to
government. While the theorem does not reveal any startling
conditions for a successful democracy, it does distill the neces-
sary conditions to two variables (under simple assumptions). If
a decision making group has a large n and a p > 0.5, then the
group is increasing its chances of optimal decision making.
Unfortunately, the theorem does not suggest a means to
achieve these conditions, though in practice many mechanisms
do exist that strive to meet them. For instance, democracies
do not rely on a single decision maker, but instead use
senates, parliaments, and referendums to increase the size of
their voting population. Moreover, for general elections, equal
voting rights facilitate large citizen participation. Furthermore,
democratic nations tend to promote universal public education
so as to ensure that competent leaders are chosen from and
by an enlightened populace. It is noted that the practices
employed by democratic nations to ensure competent decision
making are implementation choices, and a society must not
value the implementation of its government. Tradition must
be forgone if another implementation would serve better. Im-
plementations of government should be altered and amended
so as to better realize the ideals of the nation.
Technology-enabled social algorithms may provide a means
by which to reliably achieve the conditions of the “light” side
of the Condorcet jury theorem, thus ensuring optimal decision
making. Furthermore, modern algorithms have the potential to
do so in a manner that better honors the right of each citizen to
participate in government decision making as such algorithms
are not constrained by eighteenth century technology. Present
day social algorithms, in the form of information retrieval
and recommendation services, already contribute significantly
to the augmentation of human and social intelligence [2]. In
line with these developments, this article presents two social
algorithms that show promise as mechanisms for governance-
based collective decision making. One algorithm exaggerates
Thomas Paine’s citizen representation in order to accurately
simulate the behavior of a large decision making population
(n → ∞), and the other employs Adam Smith’s market
philosophy to induce participation by the enlightened within
that population (p→ 1). Both algorithms utilize the Condorcet
jury theorem to the society’s advantage.
III. DYNAMICALLY DISTRIBUTED DEMOCRACY:
SIMULATING A LARGE DECISION MAKING POPULATION
Fig. 3. An oil portrait of Thomas Paine painted by Auguste Millie`re in
1880. This is a public domain photograph courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.
Thomas Paine (portrayed in Figure 3) was born in England,
but in his middle years, he relocated to America on the
3recommendation of Benjamin Franklin. It was in America,
in the time leading up to the American Revolution, that his
enlightened ideals were well received. In 1776, the year in
which the Declaration of Independence was written, Thomas
Paine wrote a widely distributed pamphlet entitled Common
Sense which outlined the values of a democratic society
[3]. This pamphlet discussed the equality of man and the
necessity for all those at stake to partake in the decision
making processes of the group. As a formal justification of
this value, the Condorcet jury theorem would hold that a
direct democracy would be the most likely democracy to yield
optimal decisions as the voting population is the largest it can
possibly be for a nation. In practice, the desire for a direct
democracy is tempered by the tremendous burden that constant
voting would impinge on citizens (not to mention the logistical
problems such a model would incur within present day voting
infrastructures). For this reason, representation is required.
Thomas Paine states that when populations are small “some
convenient tree will afford them a State house”, but as the pop-
ulation increases it becomes a necessity for representatives to
act on behalf of their constituents. Moreover, the central tenet
of political representation is that representatives “act in the
same manner as the whole body would act were they present.”
The remainder of this section presents a social algorithm that
simulates the manner in which the whole population would act
without requiring pre-elected, long-standing representatives.
Assuming a two-option majority rule, an individual citizen’s
judgement can be placed along a continuum between the
two options such that the “political tendency” of citizen i
is denoted xi ∈ [0, 1]. For example, given United States
politics, a political tendency of 0 represents a fully Republican
perspective, a tendency of 1 represents a fully Democratic
perspective, and a tendency of 0.5 denotes a moderate. Given
this definition, there are two ways to quantify the population
as a whole. One way is to calculate the average tendency of
all citizens. That is dtend = 1n
∑i≤n
i=1 xi, where d
tend ∈ [0, 1] is
the collective tendency of the population. Given a uniform
distribution of political tendency within x, the collective
tendency approaches 0.5 as the size of the population increases
toward infinity. The other way to quantify the group is to
require that the citizen’s tendency be reduced to a binary
option (i.e. a two option vote). If a citizen has a political
tendency that is less than 0.5, then they will vote 0. For a
tendency greater than 0.5, they will vote 1. If they have a
tendency equal to 0.5 then a fair coin toss will determine their
vote. This majority wins vote is denoted dvote ∈ {0, 1}.
Imagine a direct democracy in the purest sense, where a
raise of hands or a shout of voices is replaced by an Internet
architecture and a sophisticated error- and fraud-proof ballot
system. All citizens have the potential to vote on any decisions
they wish; if they cannot vote on a particular decision for
whatever reason, they abstain from participating. In practice,
not every decision will be voted on by all n citizens. Citizens
will be constrained by time pressures to only participate
in those votes in which they are most informed or most
passionate. If we assume that all citizens have a tendency,
whether they vote or not, how would the collective tendency
and collective vote change as citizen participation waned? Let
dtend100 ∈ [0, 1] and dvote100 ∈ {0, 1} denote the collective tendency
and vote given by 100% participation. Let dtendk ∈ [0, 1] and
dvotek ∈ {0, 1} denote the collective tendency and vote if
only k-percent of the population participates. The error in the
collective tendency for k-percent participation is calculated as
etendk = |dtend100 − dtendk |.
The further away the active voters’ collective tendency is from
the full population’s collective tendency, the higher the error.
The gray line in Figure 4 plots the relationship between k
and etendk . As citizen participation wanes, the ability for the
remaining, active participants to reflect the tendency of the
whole becomes more difficult. Next, the error in the collective
vote is calculated as the proportion of voting outcomes that
are different than what a fully participating population would
have voted and is denoted evotek . The gray line in Figure 5 plots
the relationship between k and evotek . As participation wanes,
the proportion of decisions that differ from what would have
occurred given full participation decreases. As with collective
tendency, a small active voter population is unable to replicate
the voting behavior of the whole.
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Fig. 5. The relationship between k and evotek for direct democracy (gray
line) and dynamically distributed democracy (black line). The plot provides
the proportion of identical, correct decisions over a simulation that was run
with 1000 artificially generated networks composed of 100 citizens each.
As previously stated, let x ∈ [0, 1]n denote the political
tendency of each citizen in this population, where xi is the
tendency of citizen i and, for the purpose of simulation, is
determined from a uniform distribution. Assume that every
citizen in a population of n citizens uses some social network-
based system to create links to those individuals that they
believe reflect their tendency the best. In practice, these links
may point to a close friend, a relative, or some public figure
whose political tendencies resonate with the individual. In
other words, representatives are any citizens, not political
candidates that serve in public office. LetA ∈ [0, 1]n×n denote
the link matrix representing the network, where the weight of
an edge, for the purpose of simulation, is denoted
Ai,j =
{
1− |xi − xj | if link exists
0 otherwise.
In words, if two linked citizens are identical in their political
tendency, then the strength of the link is 1.0. If their tendencies
are completely opposing, then their trust (and the strength of
the link) is 0.0. Note that a preferential attachment network
growth algorithm is used to generate a degree distribution that
is reflective of typical social networks “in the wild” (i.e. scale-
free properties). Moreover, an assortativity parameter is used
to bias the connections in the network towards citizens with
similar tendencies. The assumption here is that given a system
of this nature, it is more likely for citizens to create links to
similar-minded individuals than to those whose opinions are
quite different. The resultant link matrix A is then normalized
to be row stochastic in order to generate a probability distribu-
tion over the weights of the outgoing edges of a citizen. Figure
6 presents an example of an n = 100 artificially generated
trust-based social network, where red denotes a tendency of
0.0, purple a tendency of 0.5, and blue a tendency of 1.0.
Given this social network infrastructure, it is possible to bet-
ter ensure that the collective tendency and vote is appropriately
represented through a weighting of the active, participating
population. Every citizen, active or not, is initially provide with
Fig. 6. A visualization of a network of trust links between citizens. Each
citizen’s color denotes their “political tendency”, where full red is 0, full blue
is 1, and purple is 0.5. The layout algorithm chosen is the Fruchterman-
Reingold layout.
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n “vote power” and this is represented in the vector pi ∈ Rn+,
such that the total amount of vote power in the population is
1. Let y ∈ Rn+ denote the total amount of vote power that has
flowed to each citizen over the course of the algorithm. Finally,
a ∈ {0, 1}n denotes whether citizen i is participating (ai = 1)
in the current decision making process or not (ai = 0). The
values of a are biased by an unfair coin that has probability k
of making the citizen an active participant and 1−k of making
the citizen inactive. The iterative algorithm is presented below,
where ◦ denotes entry-wise multiplication and " ≈ 1.
pi ← 0
while
∑i≤n
i=1 yi < " do
y← y + (pi ◦ a)
pi ← pi ◦ (1− a)
pi ← Api
end
In words, active citizens serve as vote power “sinks” in
that once they receive vote power, from themselves or from
a neighbor in the network, they do not pass it on. Inactive
citizens serve as vote power “sources” in that they propagate
their vote power over the network links to their neighbors
iteratively until all (or ") vote power has reached active
citizens. At this point, the tendency in the active population
is defined as δtend = x · y. Figure 4 plots the error incurred
using dynamically distributed democracy (black line), where
the error is defined as
etendk = |dtend100 − δtendk |.
Next, the collective vote δvotek is determined by a weighted
majority as dictated by the vote power accumulated by active
participants. Figure 5 plots the proportion of votes that are
different from what a fully participating population would
Fig. 4. etendk for direct de ocracy (gray
line) and dynamically distributed emocracy (black line). The plot provides th
average er or over a simulation that was ru with 1000 artificially generated
networks composed of 100 citize s each.
Dynamically distributed democracy is a social representa-
tion algorithm that provides a means by which any subset of
the population an accurately simulate the decision making
results of the whole population [4]. As such, the algorithm re-
flects the primary tenet of representation as originally outlin d
by Thomas Paine. The argument for the use of the algorithm as
a m chanism for repres ntation goes as follows. Not everyone
in a population needs to vote as others in that sam population
ore tha likely hav a nearly id ntical political tendency and
thus, identical vote. What does ne d to be recorded is the
frequency of that sentiment in the population. If an active,
voting citizen is similar in tendency to 10 non-active citizens,
then the active citizen’s ballot can be weighted by 10 to reflect
the tendencies of the non-participating citize s. Dynamically
distributed democracy accomplishes this weighting through
a similarity- or trust-based social network that is used to
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Fig. 5. The relationship between k and evotek for direct democracy (gray
line) and dynamically distributed democracy (black line). The plot provides
the proportion of identical, correct decisions over a simulation that was run
with 1000 artificially generated networks composed of 100 citizens each.
As previously stated, let x ∈ [0, 1]n denote the political
tendency of each citizen in this population, where xi is the
tendency of citizen i and, for the purpose of simulation, is
determined from a uniform distribution. Assume that every
citizen in a population of n citizens uses some social network-
based system to create links to those individuals that they
believe reflect their tendency the best. In practice, these links
may point to a close friend, a relative, or some public figure
whose political tendencies resonate with the individual. In
other words, representatives are any citizens, not political
candidates that serve in public office. LetA ∈ [0, 1]n×n denote
the link matrix representing the network, where the weight of
an edge, for the purpose of simulation, is denoted
Ai,j =
{
1− |xi − xj | if link exists
0 otherwise.
In words, if two linked citizens are identical in their political
tendency, then the strength of the link is 1.0. If their tendencies
are completely opposing, then their trust (and the strength of
the link) is 0.0. Note that a preferential attachment network
growth algorithm is used to generate a degree distribution that
is reflective of typical social networks “in the wild” (i.e. scale-
free properties). Moreover, an assortativity parameter is used
to bias the connections in the network towards citizens with
similar tendencies. The assumption here is that given a system
of this nature, it is more likely for citizens to create links to
similar-minded individuals than to those whose opinions are
quite different. The resultant link matrix A is then normalized
to be row stochastic in order to generate a probability distribu-
tion over the weights of the outgoing edges of a citizen. Figure
6 presents an example of an n = 100 artificially generated
trust-based social network, where red denotes a tendency of
0.0, purple a tendency of 0.5, and blue a tendency of 1.0.
Given this social network infrastructure, it is possible to bet-
ter ensure that the collective tendency and vote is appropriately
represented through a weighting of the active, participating
population. Every citizen, active or not, is initially provide with
Fig. 6. A visualization of a network of trust links between citizens. Each
citizen’s color denotes their “political tendency”, where full red is 0, full blue
is 1, and purple is 0.5. The layout algorithm chosen is the Fruchterman-
Reingold layout.
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n “vote power” and this is represented in the vector pi ∈ Rn+,
such that the total amount of vote power in the population is
1. Let y ∈ Rn+ denote the total amount of vote power that has
flowed to each citizen over the course of the algorithm. Finally,
a ∈ {0, 1}n denotes whether citizen i is participating (ai = 1)
in the current decision making process or not (ai = 0). The
values of a are biased by an unfair coin that has probability k
of making the citizen an active participant and 1−k of making
the citizen inactive. The iterative algorithm is presented below,
where ◦ denotes entry-wise multiplication and " ≈ 1.
pi ← 0
while
∑i≤n
i=1 yi < " do
y← y + (pi ◦ a)
pi ← pi ◦ (1− a)
pi ← Api
end
In words, active citizens serve as vote power “sinks” in
that once they receive vote power, from themselves or from
a neighbor in the network, they do not pass it on. Inactive
citizens serve as vote power “sources” in that they propagate
their vote power over the network links to their neighbors
iteratively until all (or ") vote power has reached active
citizens. At this point, the tendency in the active population
is defined as δtend = x · y. Figure 4 plots the error incurred
using dynamically distributed democracy (black line), where
the error is defined as
etendk = |dtend100 − δtendk |.
Next, the collective vote δvotek is determined by a weighted
majority as dictated by the vote power accumulated by active
participants. Figure 5 plots the proportion of votes that are
different from what a fully participating population would
Fig. 5. l ti t a evotek for direct democracy (gray
line) and dynamical y distributed democracy (black line). The plot provides
the proportion of identical, cor ect decisions over a simulation that was run
with 10 artificial y generated networks composed of 100 citizens each.
propagate v ting “power” to active voters so as to mitigate
the error incurred by wa ing citizen participation.
As previously stated, let x ∈ [0, 1]n d n te the political
tendency of each citizen in this population, where xi is the
tendency of citizen i and, for the purpose of simulation, is
determined from a uniform distribution. Assume that every
citiz n in a population of n itizens uses some social network-
based system to create links to thos individuals that they
believ reflect their tendency the best. In practice, these links
may point to a close friend, a relative, or some public figure
whose politic l tende cies resonate with the individual. In
other words, repres ntatives are any citizens, not political
c di ates that serve in public office. Let A ∈ [0, 1]n×n denote
the link matrix representing the network, where the weight of
an edge, for the purpose of simulation, is denoted
Ai,j =
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1− |xi − xj | if link exists
0 otherwise.
In words, if two linked citiz s are identic l in their political
tendency, then the strength of the link is 1.0. If t eir tend ncies
are completely opposing, then their trust (and the strength of
the link) is 0.0. Note that a preferential attachment network
growth algorithm is used to generate a degree distribution that
is reflectiv of typi al social n tworks “in the wild” (i. . cale-
free prop rti s). Moreover, an assortativity p rameter i us d
t bias the connections in th network towards citizens with
similar tendencies. The assumption here is that given a system
of this nature, it is more likely for citizens to create links to
similar-minded individuals than to those wh se opinions are
quite different. The resultant link matrix A is then normalized
to be row stochastic in order to generate a probability distribu-
tion over the weights of the outgoing e ges f a citizen. Figure
6 presents an example f an n = 100 artificially generated
trust-based social network, where ed d note a tend ncy of
0.0, purple a tendency of 0.5, and blue a tendency of 1.0.
Given this social network infrastructure, it is possible to bet-
ter ensure that the collective tendency and vote is appropriately
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represented th ough a weighting of the active, participating
population. Every citizen, active r not, is initially rovide with
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n “vote power” a d this is represented in the vector pi ∈ Rn+,
such that the total am unt of vote power in the populat on is
1. Let y ∈ Rn+ denote the total amount of vote ower that has
flowed to each citizen over the cou se of the algorithm. Finally,
a ∈ {0, 1}n denote whether citizen i s participating (ai = 1)
in the current decision making p o ess or ot (ai = 0). The
values of a are biased by an unfair c in that has probability k
of making the citizen an active participant and 1−k of making
the citizen inactive. The iterative algorithm is presented below,
where ◦ denotes entry-wise multiplication and  ≈ 1.
pi ← 0
while
∑i≤n
i=1 yi <  do
y y + (pi ◦ a)
pi ← pi ◦ (1− a)
pi ← Api
end
In words, active citizens serve as vote power “sinks” in
that o ce they receive vote power, from themselves or from
a neighbor in the network, they do not pass it on. Inactive
citizens serve as vote power “sources” in that they prop gate
their vote power over t network li ks to their neighbors
iteratively until all (or ) vote power has reached active
citizens. At this point, the tendency in the active population
is defined as δtend = x · y. Figure 4 plots the error incurred
using dynamically distributed democracy (black line), where
the error is defined as
etendk = |dtend100 − δtendk |.
Next, the collective vote δvotek is determined by a weighted
majority as dictated by the vote power accumulated by active
5participants. Figure 5 plots the proportion of votes that are
different from what a fully participating population would
have rendered (black line). In essence, if a citizen, for any
reason, is unable to participate in a decision making process,
then they may abstain from participating knowing that the
underlying social network will accurately distribute their vote
power to their neighbor or neighbor’s neighbor. In this way,
representation is dynamic, distributed, and democratic.
Thomas Paine outlines that representatives should maintain
“fidelity to the public” and believes this is accomplished
through frequent elections [3]. The utilization of an Internet-
based social network system affords repeated “elections” in
the form of citizens creating outgoing links to other citizens as
they please, when they please, and to whom them please. That
is, citizens can dynamically choose representatives who need
not be picked from only a handful of candidates. Moreover,
if a selected representative falters in their ability to represent
a citizen, incoming links can be immediately retracted from
them. Such an architecture turns the representative’s status
from that of elected public official to that of a self-intentioned
citizen.
While many countries have political institutions that are
set up according to a left, right, and moderate agenda, the
individual perspectives of a citizen may be more complex.
In many cases, a citizen’s political tendency may only be
amenable to a multi-dimensional representation. In a multi-
relational social network, the links are augmented with labels
in order to denote the type of trust one citizen has for another.
In this way, voting power propagates over the links in a manner
that is biased to the domain of the decision. For example,
citizen i may trust citizen j in the domain of “education”
but not in the domain of “health care”. This design has been
articulated in [5]. Supporting systems, including the means
by which ballots are proposed and issues are discussed, is
presented in [6].
With the Internet, supporting Web technologies, and dy-
namically distributed democracy, it is possible to dynamically
determine a representative-layer of government that accurately
reflects a full direct democracy. In this respect, the larger
population helps to ensure, according to the Condorcet jury
theorem, that the decisions are either definitely right or def-
initely wrong. Other technologies can be utilized to induce
participation by only those that are more likely than not to
choose the optimal decision.
IV. DECISION MARKETS: INCENTIVIZING AN
ENLIGHTENED MAJORITY
Adam Smith (portrayed in Figure 7) was a Scottish moral
and economic philosopher who is best known for his two most
famous works entitled The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759)
and An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth
of Nations (1776). In the latter work, Adam Smith outlines
the economic benefits of a division of labor within a society.
Each citizen in the population serves a particular specialized
function, and only in the dependency relationships amongst
these specialists does an efficient, decentralized economy
emerge. With many suppliers and consumers, the production
Fig. 7. An etching of Adam Smith originally created by Cadell and Davies
(1811), John Horsburgh (1828), or R.C. Bell (1872). This is a public domain
photograph courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.
requirements of a society as a whole is difficult to know. Adam
Smith appreciated markets for their ability to expose these
requirements through the “natural price” of goods. Moreover,
he understood that competition within the market was a nec-
essary driving force guaranteeing an accurate representation
of commodity prices. Adam Smith states that when a citizen
pursues “his own interest he frequently promotes that of
the society more effectually than when he really intends to
promote it” [7].
Market mechanisms are not only useful for determining
commodity prices as they can be generally applied to informa-
tion aggregation and ultimately, to collective decision making.
Such markets are called decision markets [8]. Similar to a
division of labor, the knowledge required to make optimal
decisions for a society is dispersed throughout the population.
For difficult problems, it is naı¨ve to think that a single
individual has the requisite knowledge to yield an optimal
decision, much like it is naı¨ve to think a single merchant will
offer the optimal price. A decision market functions because
it guarantees a return on investment for quality information.
In this respect, a decision market is a tool for attracting a
population of knowledgeable citizens much like a commodity
market is a tool for attracting knowledgeable speculators. In
short, a decision market is a self-selection mechanism that
incentivizes participation from those who have knowledge
regarding the problem and are confident in their knowledge
and discourages participation from others without forbidding
it.
Decision markets reward individuals for buying low and
selling high, thus encouraging those who believe they know
which way the market will move to contribute their infor-
mation in the form of the price at which they purchase
and sell shares. A decision market differs from commodity
markets (such as the New York Stock Exchange) in that stocks
represent objective states about the world that can ultimately
be determined, but are presently unknown. For example, given
the market question “Will decisions markets be used in U.S.
6government by the year 2013?”, shares of stocks in a “yes”
outcome and in a “no” outcome are purchased and sold on
the market. A high market price for a stock indicates that
the collective believes this outcome to be true with a high
likelihood. The purpose of the market is to incentivize knowl-
edgeable citizens to contribute to the decision by rewarding
them for useful contributions and conversely to inflict a penalty
for contributing poor information.
In order to demonstrate the benefits of incentives in decision
making, a simulation is provided. Suppose there exists n
citizens and a d-dimensional “knowledge space”. Each citizen
is represented as a point in this space. That is, citizens have
different degrees of knowledge in the various dimensions
(i.e. domains) of the space. A citizen’s point in this space is
generated by a normal distribution with a mean of p ∈ [0, 1]
and a variance of (p(1− p))2. Next, there exists an objective
truth in this spaced called the environment. For the purpose
of simulation, the environment e is the largest valued point in
the knowledge space (i.e. ei = 1 : 1 ≤ i ≤ d). There also
exists a market m which denotes the collective’s subjective
understanding of the objective environment. For the purpose
of simulation, the market starts as the smallest valued point in
the knowledge space (i.e. mi = 0 : 1 ≤ i ≤ d). Each citizen
participates in the market, moving the market closer or further
away from the environment. The closer the market is to the
environment, the more accurate the collective decision. There
are two markets in the simulation: an incentive-free market
and an incentive market. The results of these two markets
are compared in order to demonstrate the benefits of using
incentives.
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Fig. 8. The states of the incentive-free and incentive markets (purple) and the
objective state of the environment (green) are diagrammed in a 3-dimensional
knowledge space. There exists two paths: the incentive-free market path (red)
and the incentive market path (blue). The dotted cubes denote the range of
an incentive-free market (red - 0.5) and incentive market (blue - 0.75) for a
p = 0.5. Refer to the text for a description of the diagrammed market paths.
Before presenting the results of a larger simulation, a small
diagrammed example is provided to better elucidate the sim-
ulation rules. Figure 8 diagrams a 3-dimensional knowledge
space with both markets (bottom left purple point) and an
environment (top right green point). The behavior of the
citizens denotes the market paths (red and blue arrows). Also,
there exists a p = 0.5 population of 3 citizens, where citizen
c1 = [0.7, 0.5, 0.4], citizen c2 = [0.5, 0.6, 0.3], and citizen
c3 = [0.3, 0.5, 0.7]. At time step t = 0, both the incentive-
free and incentive markets are at [0, 0, 0]. At t = 1, citizen
c1 participates in both markets. In the incentive-free market,
citizen c1 has no incentive to contribute his best knowledge
and thus, randomly chooses a dimension in which to move
the market. According to the diagram, the citizen’s random
choice moves the market in the 3rd dimension by 0.4. In
the incentivized market, citizen c1 chooses the dimension in
which he has the most knowledge (i.e. the dimension with
the maximum value). Moreover, a biased coin toss determines
whether he participates or not, where c1 has a 70% chance
of participating in the incentive market. Assuming the coin
toss permits it, c1 moves the incentivized market in the 1st
dimension to 0.7. This process continues in sequence for
citizens c2 and c3. Assuming that all citizens participate
in both markets, at the end, the incentive-free market is
located at point [0.5, 0.5, 0.4], while the incentive market is
located at point [0.7, 0.6, 0.7]. The market error is calculated
as the normalized Euclidean distance between the final market
position and the environment for a given p,
edistp =
1√
d
√√√√i≤d∑
i=1
(ei −mi)2.
The incentive-free market has an error of 0.287 and the
incentive market has an error of 0.113. Thus, the incentive
market is closest to the environment. There are two distinctions
between the markets. In the incentive-free market, there is
no benefit to producing an enlightened solution, so the cit-
izen makes a contribution without comparing his knowledge
against the environment. In the incentive market, there are two
incentive structures. The first incentive is to participate along
the dimension in which the citizen is most knowledgeable.
The second incentive is to participate only if the citizen has
a satisfactory degree of knowledge. This means that poor
information is excluded from the market and that the most
valuable knowledge of the citizen is included.
To demonstrate the effects of an incentive-free and incentive
market on a larger population, over various values of p, and
in a 50-dimensional knowledge space simulation results are
provided. Figure 9 depicts the normalized Euclidean distance
error of the incentive-free market (gray line) and the incentive
market (black line) for varying p. Next, Figure 10 provides
the proportion of correct collective decisions. A decision is
either correct or incorrect. While the market yields a point in
[0, 1]d, rounding the dimension values of the point to either
1 or 0 provides the final decision made by the citizens. For
a given p, the proportion of times that the market rounds to
the environment is the proportion of correct decisions and is
denoted edecip ∈ [0, 1].
It is the principle of self-selection, and therefore citizen
choice, that provides the mechanism by which knowledge
is aggregated. Choice is manifested in a number of ways.
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Fig. 9. The relationship between p and edistp for an incentive-free market (gray
line) and an incentive market (black line). The plot provides the average error
over 1000 simulations with d = 50 and n = 1000.
Fig. 10. The relationship between p and edecip for an incentive-free market
(gray line) and an incentive market (black line). The plot provides the
proportion of correct decisions over 1000 simulations with d = 50 and
n = 1000.
that enters the market. Second, citizens choose how often to
participate. The market, therefore, induces citizens to become
more knowledgeable so as to gain from the market. Finally,
citizens choose the extent of their participation. If a citizen has
knowledge that is not well reflected in the market, suggesting
that their knowledge is unique and therefore valuable, the
citizen is incentivized to participate more so than if the market
closely mimics their knowledge. In decision markets, it is the
pricing mechanism of the market that serves the incentivizing
role. However, the asset traded in the market need not be
money. To maintain the egalitarian nature of self-selection,
the market can be based in virtual money with rewards,
reputation, or other social inducements as the backing. It has
been demonstrated that virtual money is able to preserve the
accuracy of decision markets [9].
As presented in the simulation the decisions of a society
are multi-dimensional. It is likely that no single citizen has
the requisite knowledge in all dimensions to make informed
decisions. The ability to reach an optimal decision is de-
pendent on the many dimensions such that ignorance of
one dimension may lead to a suboptimal conclusion. The
probability parameter of the Condorcet jury theorem model
is misleading. It is not through probability that one achieves
an optimal decision, but through the careful application of
knowledge to the decision. The use of a market is not a
guarantee that decision makers have p > 0.5. The market
is a guarantee that citizen knowledge has been thoughtfully
applied to the decision.
V. CONCLUSION
The purpose of a democratic government is to preserve and
support the ideals of its population. The ideals established
during the Enlightenment are general in nature: life, liberty,
and the pursuit of happiness. In articulating these values, the
founders of modern democracies provided a moral heritage
that remains highly regarded in societies today. However, it
should be remembered that it is the ideals that are valuable,
not the specific implementation of the systems that protect
and support them. If there is another implementation of
government that better realizes these ideals, then, by the rights
of man, it must be enacted. It was the great thinkers of the
eighteenth century Enlightenment who provided the initial
governance systems. It is the challenge and the mandate of
the Information Age to redesign these governance systems in
light of present day technologies.
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Fig. 10. The relationship between p and edecip for an incentive-free market
(gray line) and an incentive market (black line). The plot provides the
proportion of correct decisions over 1000 simulations with d = 50 and
n = 1000.
that enters the market. Second, citizens choose how often to
participate. The market, therefore, induces citizens to become
more knowledgeable so as to gain from the market. Finally,
citizens choose the extent of their participation. If a citizen has
knowledge that is not well reflected in the market, suggesting
that their knowledge is unique and therefore valuable, the
citizen is incentivized to participate more so than if the market
closely mimics their knowledge. In decision markets, it is the
pricing mechanism of the market that serves the ncentivizing
role. However, the asset traded in the market need not be
money. To maintain the egalitarian nature of self-selection,
the market can be based in virtual money with rewards,
reputation, or other social inducements as the backing. It has
been demonstrated that virtual money is able to preserve the
accuracy of decision markets [9].
As presented in the simulation the decisions of a society
are multi-dimensional. It is likely that no single citizen has
the requisite knowledge in all dimensions to make informed
decisions. The ability to reach an optimal decision is de-
pendent on the many dimensions such that ignorance of
one dimension may lead to a suboptimal conclusion. The
probability parameter of the Condorcet jury theorem model
is misleading. It is not through probability that one achieves
an optimal decision, but through the careful application of
knowledge to the decision. The use of a market is not a
guarante that decision makers have p > 0.5. The market
is a gua antee that citizen knowledge has been thoughtfully
applied to the decision.
V. CONCLUSION
The purpose of a democratic government is to preserve and
support the ideals of its population. The ideals established
during the Enlightenment are general in nature: life, liberty,
and the pursuit of happiness. In articulating these values, the
founders of modern democracies provided a moral heritage
that remains highly regarded in societies today. However, it
should be remembered that it is the ideals that are valuable,
not the s ecific mplementation of the systems that protect
and support them. If there is another implementation of
government that better realizes these ideals, then, by the rights
of man, it must be enacted. It was the great thinkers of the
eighteenth century Enlightenment who provided the initial
governance systems. It is the challenge and the mandate of
the Information A e to redesign these governance systems in
light of present day technolog es.
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knowledge that is not well reflected in the market, suggesting
that their knowledge is unique and therefore valuable, the
citizen is incentiviz d to participate more so than if the market
closely mimics their knowledge. In decision mar ts, it is the
pricing mechanism of the market that serves the incentivizing
role. However, the asset traded in the market need not be
money. To maintain the egalitarian nature of self-selection,
the market can be based in virtual money with rewards,
reputatio , or other social inducement as the backi g. It has
been demonstrated that virtual money is able to preserve the
accuracy of decision markets [9].
As presented in the simulation the decisions of a society
are multi-dimensional. It is likely that no single citizen has
the requisite knowledge in all dimensions to make informed
decisio s. The ability to reach an optimal decision is de-
pendent on the many dimensions such that ignorance of
one dimension may lead to a suboptimal conclusion. The
probability parameter of the Condorcet jury theorem model
is misleading. It is not through probability that one achieves
an optimal decision, but through the careful application of
knowledge to the decision. The use of a market is not a
guarantee that decision makers have p > 0.5. The market
is a guarantee that citizen knowledge has been thoughtfully
applied to the decision.
V. CONCLUSION
The purpose of a democratic government is to preserve and
support the ideals of its population. The ideals established
during the Enlightenment are general in nature: life, liberty,
and the pursuit of happiness. In articulating these values, the
founders of modern democracies provided a moral heritage
that remains highly regarded in societies today. However, it
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